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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
In The Matter of Habeas Corpus for
Howard Wayne, Linda Kay, Sheryl Rae,
and Karen Taylor.
Minors
By LaPriel Taylor,
Petitioner and Appellant
vs.
George Q. Waddoups and Marie Waddoups,
his wife,
Defendt:tnts and Respondents
and
In The Matter of the Adoption of Howard
Wayne Taylor. Linda Kay Taylor, Sheryl
Rae Taylor and Karen Taylor,
Minors
By George Q. Waddoups and Marie Waddoups, his wife,
Defendants and Respon.dtents
vs.
LaPriel Taylor,
Contestant and Appellant

Case No. 7720

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In the case before the court the Petition for Adoption of Howard Wayne Taylor, Linda Kay Taylor, Sheryl
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Rae Taylor and Karon Taylor was filed by the defendants on the 8th day of December 1950. On the 6th day of
January 1951 an Order of Adoption was entered by the
court adopting the children to the defendants. A purported Con-sent of Adoption, which had been signed before a notary public, was filed by the defendants, and
the Order of Adoption issued by the court was based
. upon said consent.
No notice of th~ hearing was given to either parents
of said children. On the 26th day of February 1951 the
plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and
an Order of Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by the
court. The petition was filed by LaPriel Taylor, the
mother of said children, and was filed for the purpose of
obtaining the custody of the children. The plaintiff also
filed on the 28th day of February 1951 a !lotion to
Vacate the Order of Adoption entered as aforesaid. The
motion was based upon an affidavit and a Notice of Motion was filed on the same date, together with an Answer
to the Petition of Adoption.
The defendants filed their Answer to the Writ of
Habeas Corpus and the matter was set for hearing on the
12th day of :March 1951 but was continued upon motion
of the defendants to the 26th day of March 1951. On
the 26th day of March 1951 the defendants filed a
brief in support of the Order of Adoption and requested
a continuance until the 8th day of April 1951. On the
26th day of :March the plaintiff was given time to file
a reply brief. On the 5th day of April1951 the plaintiff
4
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filed her brief. On the 8th day of April 1951 the court
continued the Inat.ter until the 22nd day of April and gave
the defendants the right to file a reply brief, which was
done on or about the 20th day of April 1951. On the
22nd day of ~-lpril 1951 the court granted plaintiff's Motion to Vacate the Order of Adoption and the hearing
on the "\Vrit of Habeas Corpus together with the hearing
on the Petition for Adoption was set for the 14th day of
May 1951 at the hour of 2 o'clock p.m. Since the facts
in both cases were the same, the two cases were heard
jointly. The hearing was had and the court on the 28th
day of 1Iay 1951 entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgn1ent on the Writ of Habeas
Corpus. The court awarded the writ in part and awarded
Howard Wayne Taylor to the mother, LaPriel Taylor,
and denied the writ in part and awarded the custody of
Linda Kay, Sheryl Rae and Karen to the defendants
George Q. and ~farie "\Vaddoups. On the 18th day of June
1951 the court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Judgment and entered an Order of Adoption and granted the Petition of Adoption in part and
denied it in part. The court denied the Petition of Adoption for Howard Wayne Taylor but granted the Petition
for Adoption of Linda Kay, Sheryl Rae and Karen Taylor to the defendants, and from these judgments the
plaintiff appeals. LaPriel Taylor, the mother of the
children in this case will be called the plaintiff and George ·
Q. "\Vaddoups and Marie "\V addoups, his wife, the adopting parents, will be called the defendants.

5
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, LaPriel Taylor, and her former husband, Howard Wayne Taylor, were the parents of four
children- Howard Wayne, Linda Kay, Sheryl Rae and
Karen Taylor. She was married to Howard Taylor in
1940 and obtained a divorce in Cache County in 1944. She
re-married him in 1946 and obtained a second divorce
from Howard Wayne Taylor on the 13th day of December
1950 in the Third Judicial District. Throughout their
marriage the husband of the plaintiff was very unstable
and irresponsible and wilfully failed to support his
family. He was sentenced to the State penitentiary upon
a charge of burglary and received a dishonorable discharge from the Army Air Corps. He deserted his
family intermittently throughout their marriage. He deserted them once in 1948, once in 1949, and deserted his
wife in April 1950.
When Mr. Taylor failed to support his family,- the
plaintiff was forced to go to her parents' home and obtain assistance from the Welfare until she could obtain
einployment with which to support herself and minor children. From September 1948 until December 1950 the
plaintiff was suffering from ill health and was unable
to work to support herself and minor children. On June
1, 1949 she placed three of her children with the defendants who were plaintiff's second cousins. The Cache
County Department of Public Welfare supported them
in the defendants' hmne from June 1, 1949 to about January 15, 1950. On June 1st the mother placed the children
6
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with the defendants so that she could go to California,
where her husband was then working for the Southern
Pacific Railroad, in an effort to effect a reconciliation
and to persuade hin1 to· support her and the 1ninor children.
He lost his job and they returned to Cache County
around the 1st day of October 1949 and plaintiff and her
husband lived with plaintiff's parents in Nibley, Cache
County, Utah, until the 15th day of January 1950. The
husband lived \dth the plaintiff until November 28, 1949,
when he deserted the plaintiff and his children. Prior
to the tin1e he (ieserted the1n on the 28th of November
1949 he sold his automobile for the sum of $450 and
promised to give the plaintiff $250 to enable her to obtain
an operation needed to restore her to normal health.
Instead of giving the money to the plaintiff he took the
money and deserted her as above stated.
On or about the 15th day of January 1950 the plaintiff moved to Ogden and took her four minor children
with her. She rented an apartlnent and due to her ilnpaired health, and because of the tender years of the
children, and also due to the fact that the father would
not support them, she obtained assistance from the Weber
County Departlnent of Public Welfare.
Neither the Weber County Department of Public
Welfare nor the Cache County Department of Public
Welfare were able to give the plaintiff the needed medical attention to restore her to health. Her physical condition grew worse and throughout this entire time the
7
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plaintiff had fainting spells and fainted once and twice
a day due to anen1ia caused from hemorrhages.
During the last two weeks in February 1950 the
plaintiff's parents were forced to take two of the ~hil
dren and care for them as the plaintiff was unable to
do so on account of her ill health. On or about the 1st
day of March 1950 the defendants went to the plaintiff's
home and plaintiff told the defendants that due to her
health and because of the acts of her husband she was
going to be forced to place her children for adoption
and if the defendant would bring a consent of adoption
on the 9th of March 1950 her husband.. would be there
and they would sign said consent. On the 9th day of
March 1950 the defendants came to the plaintiff's home
with a purported consent of adoption which the plaintiff
and her husband signed before a notary public in Ogden,
Utah. The plaintiff and her husband signed the Consent
of Adoption and surrendered the children to the defendants.
That on the 9th day of March 1950 prior to the tinie
that the plaintiff signed the purported Consent of Adoption, the defendants told the plaintiff that if her healh
improved and she got to the point where she could care
for the children that they would return the children to
her. That on the 8th day of March 1950 the defendants
told the plaintiff!s parents that they would return the
children to the plaintiff if her health improved and she
was able to care for them. This information was given
to the plaintiff by her parents prior to the signing of the
8
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purposed Consent of Adoption, and the defendants now
refuse to fulfil the agreement entered into by and between the plaintiff and defendant on the said 9th day of
March 1950.
The plaintiff then went to Salt Lake City with her
husband who had promised to provide her with the necessary medical attention to correct the condition which was
then causing her ill health. During the month of April
the plaintiff's husband was arrested in Ogden, Utah, upon
a misdemeanor and was sentenced to the Ogden City
jail. He escaped fron1 the jail and deserted the plaintiff.
The plaintiff at that tilne was pregnant and due to her
ill health and pregnancy she was forced to again apply
for assistance from Salt Lake County.
From the 9th day of 1\tiarch 1950 to November 1950
she visited the children on several occasions and took
presents and articles of clothing to them. She also kept
in touch with the defendants by mail. The defendants
are the second cousins of the plaintiff and the plaintiff
was well acquainted with the home conditions in the defendants' home prior to the time she gave the childr~n
to the defendants.
On the 28th day of November 1950 a fifth child was
born to the plaintiff and her husband and on that date the
doctors at the Salt Lake County hospital performed an
operation upon the plaintiff-the operation necessary to
correct plaintiff's ill health.
On the 8th day of Deceinber 1950 the plaintiff informed the defendants that her health had in1proved and
9
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that she wished the children returned to her, but the defendants refused to do so. During the Christmas holidays
in December 1950 the plaintiff again requested the defendants to return the children to her and they again refused to surrender the children.
The Cache County Department of Public Welfare
knew of plaintiff's desire to regain the custody of the
children but they and the defendants failed to inform the
court of this fact on the 6th day of January 1951 when
the first Order of Adoption was granted.
That at the time of the hearing on the 14th day of
May 1951 the plaintiff was then engaged to be married
to one Kernoff Christensen, who was of the age of 41
years and is a welder by trade and capable of earning
a regular weekly income of $80 per week.
That since the hearing and on or about the 20th day
of June 1951 the contemplated marriage was consummated. Kern off Christensen testified in court that he had
been with the children on different occasions and that if
the children were given to the plaintiff, upon their marriage, he would assume the responsibility of supporting
and maintaining them and that he would see they were
not placed upon welfare. On the 28th day of ~{ay 1951 the
court granted the Writ of Habeas Corpus in part and
awarded the custody of Howard Wayne r:raylor, age 10
years, to the plaintiff, and denied the hearing in part
and awarded Linda Kay, Sheryl Rae and Karen to the
defendants. On the 18th day of June 1950 the court
granted the Petition for Adoption in part and granted
10
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au Order of Adoption to the defendants of Linda Kay,
Sheryl Rae and l(aren and denied the Petition of Adoption for IIoward 'Yayne Taylor. From these judgments
the plaintiff now appeals.

ARGUMENTS

1. That the court erred in finding that the Consent
of Adoption was in accordance with the provisions of
Section 14-4-8, Utah Code Annotated of 1943.

2. The court further erred in finding that the Consent of Adoption as signed by the plaintiff was irrevocable.
3. The court erred in Inaking any finding in the
adoption proceedings that the plaintiff had abandoned
her children for the reason that there were no allegations
in the petition that the children had been abandoned by
the plaintiff, nor did the petition pray that the children
be found to be deserted and abandoned children.
4. That the court erred in finding that it was for the
best welfare and interest of said children that they be
adopted by the defendants.
5. That the court erred in entering its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment in both the
adoption proceedings and the writ of habeas corpus, as
they were contrary to and not supported by the evidence.
11
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The provisions of Chapter 4, Title 14, so far as are
relevant to this case, are as follows: Section 14-4-4,
Section 14-4-8, Utah Code Annotated 1943.
14-4-4.

Consent to Adoption.

"A legitimate child cannot be adopted without the
consent of its parents, if living, nor an illegitimate child
without the consent of its mother, if living, except that
consent is not necessary from a father or mother who
has been judicially deprived of the custody of the child
on account of cruelty, neglect or desertion; provided,
that the district court may <?Tder the adoption of any
child, without notice to or consent in court of the parent
or parents thereof, whenever it shall appear that the
parent or parents whose consent would otherwise be
required have theretofore, in writing, acknowledged before any officer authorized to take acknowledgements,
released his or her or their control or custody of such
child to any agency licensed to receive children for
placmnent or adoption under Chapter 3 of this Title, and
such agency consents, in writing, to such adoption."
14-4-8. Procedure-Agreement of Adopting Parents.
The person adopting a child and the child adopted,
and the other persons whose consent is necessary, must
appear before the district court of the county where the
person adopting resides, and the necessary consent must
thereupon be signed and an agremnent be executed by the
person adopting to the effect that the child shall be
12
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adopted and treated in all respects as his own lawful
child.
It seen1s clear that the alleged consent in the case
at bar was not n1ade in confonuity with the statutes, as
it was not signed before the court nor was it signed in the
county where the adopting parents reside.
That the petitioners and the children to be adopted
and all persons whose consent is necessary must appear
before the District Court in the county where the adopting parents reside and the necessary consent must thereupon be signed.
The consent in the case at bar was not signed before
the court as required by this section of the Statute but
was signed before a notary public in Ogden, a fact which
was found by the trial court.
In the 1933 Utah Code Annotated, 14-4-8, the statute
provides as follows:
Procedure -

Contract of Adopting Parents:

The person adopting a child and the child adopted,
and the other persons whose consent is necessary, must
appear before the district court of the county where the
person adopting resides, and the necessary consent must
thereupon be signed and an agreeinent be executed by the
person adopting to the effect that the child shall be
'8.dopted and treated in all respects as his own lawful
child; provided, that if the persons whose consent is
necessary are not within the county, then their written

13
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consent, duly acknowledged in the manner provided for
the acknowledgement of deeds, shall be filed at the time
of the application for adoption.
This has been the law in Utah for a number of years
but the Legislature in 1941 deemed it advisable to change
the provisions of Sections 14-4-8 in the 1933 Code to correct certain abuses that then existed.
If the consent of adoption in the case now before
the court is held to comply with the provisions of our
Statute, then no change would have been made by the
amendment made in 1941, as this holding would in effect
continue the practice that existed prior to the amendment in 1941.
The Section 14-4-8 was made by the Legislature to
protect both adopting parents and parents surrendering
children for adoption.
By requiring persons to appear before the court
when they signed a Consent of Adoption to their minor
children, the court can then protect parents from fraud,
misrepresentation, force or undue influence in obtaining
consents of adoption. The court being an impartiai body
could see that parents are informed and that they fully
understand the effect of the act which they are performing. In the case at ba.r if this consent had been signed before the court and, as in this case, the parents were told·
they could have the children back upon certain contingencies, the court would have taken the proper steps to
14
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protect the 1nother's rights to the children. Oftentimes
consents of adoption are granted while under great emotional strain and, as in this case, at times they are signed
while suffering from discouragement and despair, and
to pern1it a consent to be signed before a notary public
and to allow prospective foster parents to take advantage
of these conditions and to "railroad" persons into signing consents before the consequence of their acts have
been duly considered. Since the adoption statute is
purely statutory and since the matter involved is so extremely in1portant, that of placing the lives of your children in the hands of another should be strictly construed.

Sufficiency of Consent
There was no adoption of com1non law. This aspect
of jurisprudence was known to the Civil Law of Rome,
to the ancient Assyrians and to the early Germans.
Ashlock v. Ashlock, 360 Ill. 115.
But what provisions we have on the subject is purely
statutory, and in derogation of common law.
Hook v. Wright, 329 Ill. 299;
Keal v. Rhydderick, 317 Ill. 231 ;
Rabbitt v. Weber & Co., 297 Ill. 491, 31 So.
( 2) 163 211 La. 910.
In Ashlock v. Ashlock, 360 Ill. 115, the Court said
(P. 121):
Where a Court in exercising a special statutory jurisdiction the record must show upon its

15
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face that the partiular proceeding is one upon
which the court has authority to act. .T urisdiction
in such cases is never presutned . . . (Rice v.
Travis, 216 Ill. 249) ... Although adoption statutes are construed liberally . . . there must be
substantial compliance with the provision of the
statute conferring jurisdiction or the proceedings
will be void.
In Watts v. Dull, 104 Ill. 86, one of the questions
presented was the effect of the failure of the petitioner's
husband to join in the petition for adoption. The Supreule Court held that the petition was insufficient to
confer jurisdiction and that the adoption decree wa.S
a nullity.
In discussing the Watts case, the Court in the Ashlock decision said, P. 123:
In the recent case of ::McConnell v. McConnell,
(345 Ill. 70) where it was announced that the rule
of strict compliance was no longer adhered to, we
expressly referred to the decision on the Watts
case as correct for the reason that there had not
been substantial compliance with the statute.
The Supreme Court in People v. Cole, 322 Ill. 95
(in reversing 320 Ill. Appr. 413 said:
"The adoption proceedings being statutory,
the validity of a decree of adoption depends upon
the compliance with every essential requirement
of the statute authorizing it."
For the same ruling, see :
In re Bohn, 306 Ill. 214;
People v. Fahey, 230 Ill. App. 143.
1()
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One A1nerican Jurisprudence P. 37.
"The rule in the great majority of the jurisdictions
wherein the question has arisen, is that a natural parent's
consent to the proposed adoption of a child, duly given
in compliance with a statute requiring such consent as a
prerequisite to such adoption, 1nay be effectively withdrawn or revoked by the natural parent before the adoption has been finally approved and decreed by the court,
and a natural parent's withdrawal of consent to an adoption, even after the order confinning the adoption has
been made, but prior to the expiration of the time for
filing a petition for a rehearing, may sometimes prove
effective.
And while it has been indicated that the natural parent's right to withdraw consent to adoption is entirely
a matter of personal choice, but not dependent upon any
stated reason, it has also been indicated that intervening vested rights on the part of the adopting parents or
the child might exclude the natural parents from withdrawing consent and thus barring the adoption."
In 2 C. J. S. Adoption, Par. 21 (4) the genera;! rule as
the effect of the withdrawal of consent to adoption by the
natural parent is stated as follows:
Consent may be Withdrawn Before Adoption.
"Consent 1nay be withdrawn at any time before adoption, even though given in writing, and accompanied by
transfer of the custody of the child, and even though the

17
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natural parent had abandoned the child, and an adoption
based upon a consent that has been withdrawn is void."
Washington
In State Ex Rel Town v. Superior Court, 165 Pac.
(2nd) 862. "Certiorari issued to review the order of the
Juvenile Court of Kitsop County adjudicating a four
year old child to be dependent. It was the illegitimate
child of one Irene who was admittedly unfit for its
custody. On November 10,1944 said Irene (mother) gave
her written consent to the adoption of her child and on
January 26, 1945, while said adoption proceedings were
pending, she appeared in court and revoked her consent.
The court aHowed her revocation and returned to her the
child. The statutes of Washington are almost identical
with those of lllinois."

~ent

Other cases in this jurisdiction holding that a conmay be withdrawn are:
Nelms v. Birkland, 279 P. 748, 153 Wash. 243;
In Re Roderick, 291 P. 225, 158 Wash. 377.

In the Nelms case the court quoted with approval
1 C. P. 1378:
"A natural parent, by entering into a contract
for the adoption of his child by another, waives his
rights to the custody and control of the child, but
subject to his liability to be sued for his breach
of his contract, he may revoke his gift and resume
custody of his child at any time before a legal
adoption has been made.
18
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Oregon
In re: Adoption of Capparelli, 175 P. (2nd) 1933,
the Oregon Suprmne Court said as follows in holding
that a consent may be revoked:

It is the general rule that the natural parent
who has consented to the adoption of a child in
compliance with a statute which 1nakes such consent a prerequisite to adoption 1nay effectively
withdraw or revoke his consent at any time before the court has made a decree of adoption.
(cases cited).
\Y est Virginia
In Harold Y. Craig, 59 W. Va., the court held that
the consent relates to the time of the entry of decree,
citing with approval :Marion v. Fehy, 11 W. V a. 402:
The entry of a consent decree is a statement
on the record, not theretofore the parties agreed
to enter such a decree, but that they now (when
the decree is entered) consent to its entry, and if
they do not when it is so entered, it cannot be
entered.
The court went on to speak with approval of the
above conclusions :
The rule announced by this court in that case
seems to us to be sustained by sound reasoning
... parties may agree out of court as they choose,
but the entry of a consent decree requires consent
to its entry by the parties, and if one of the parties who will be 1naterially affected thereby withdraws his consent and objects to its entry at the
time it is offered, it cannot be entered.
19
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:h1:ichigan
In Re White's Adoption, 300 :Mich. 378, 1 N.W. (2d)
579 (1940) the naturalnwther of the n1inor child had duly
consented to its adoption in conformity with statutory
requirements as to consent, and a decree of adoption was
thereupon duly entered. Subsequently, before the expiration of the statutory period during \Yhich decrees might
be modified or set aside, the natural mother filed a written withdrawal of her consent and petitioned that the
decree of adoption be vacated. In affirming an order
vacating the decree of adoption the court said:
The issue thus narrows itself down to the
question whether the last part of the order of the
probate court hereinbefore quoted at length, made
upon the rehearing vacating and setting aside the
previous order confirming adoption, was a proper
order. This court is asked to reverse the findings
of the probate court, and of the circuit court upon
appeal, and to hold that this part of the order
should be set aside. At the Yery out~et, we are
confronted with the fact that the natural parent
did withdraw her consent to the adoption during
the ninety da~-s' period while the n1atter of confirming the adoption was still within the authority
and control of the probate court if a petition for
rehearing be filed. After a rehearing had been
granted and before any further order might he
made by the probate court, that court was then
confronted with the established fact that it no
longer had the necessary consent of one of the
natural parents. It has been withdrawn.
Appellants contend that ~larcena 'Vhitr, the
natural mother, could not withdraw her consent
20
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at the ti1ne it was atteu1pted without showing
fraud and dure~~ in the procurement thereof.
\Yhile this question has not been squarely before
us, it has been raised in various proceedings in
other jurisdictions. In .Minnesota it has been held
that the n1other's consent n1av be revoked at anv
ti1ne before the child is legaliy adopted, State e~
rel Platzer v. Beardsley, 149 Minn. 435_1~3 N.W.
956. In \Yashington, it is held that adoption is a
contract between the parties but that a natural
parent 1nay revoke his consent at any time before
a legal adoption has been made, subject to his liability to be sued for breach of contract; and that
when the written consent is once revoked, the
necessary consent being absent, such an order cannot be 1nade. In re Nelms, 153 Wash. 242, 279 P.
746. See, also, Fitz v. Carpenter, Tex. Civ. App.,
1:2-± S.\Y. (2d) 420. In the case at bar, the probate
judge stated no reason for setting aside the original order, and the record before us contains
none of the testimony taken either in the probate
court or the circuit court on the appeal. Without
a record disclosing what reasons impeUed the
mother to withdraw her consent, we have no occasion to pass upon the question whether such reasons were sufficient, if indeed any stated reason
is necessary beyond the mere fact she had changed
her mind. It is our opinion that under the circumstances of this case, no vested rights having intervened, the natural mother had the right to withdraw her consent to the adoption during the
ninety days while the probate court still had control over the 1natter of rehearing."
In the annotation to the foregoing case (130 ALR
1030) the 1najority and 1ninority rules as to withdrawal
21
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of consent by the natural parent is thus stated (103839):
The rule in a majority of the jurisdictions
wherein the question has arisen is that a natural
parent's consent to the proposed adoption of a
child, duly given in cmnpliance ''4/ith a statute requiring such consent as a prerequisite to an adoption may be effectively withdrawn or revoked by
the natural parent before the adoption has been
finally approved and decreed by the court, RE
WHITE ( Mich) (reported herewith) 1034 : RE
NELMS (1929) 153 Wash. 242, 279 P. 740. And
see State ex rei. Platzer v. Beardsley (1921) 149
Minn. 435, 183 N.W. 956; Re Anderson (1933) 189
Minn. 85, 248 N.,V. 657; Fitts v. Carpenter (1939);
Tex. Civ. App. 124 S.W. (2d) 420.
Ohio
In French v. Catholic League, 60 Ohio App. 442,
144 N.E. (2nd) 113, the mother of an infant gave her
consent to an adoption of her child and gave the child
to the Welfare League. In allowing her to withdraw
her consent before decree, the court used the following
language:
Why should such an unfortunate mother not
be permitted to revoke her prior consent for relinquishment when she has not been advised of its
acceptance and it has not yet been acted upon?
. . . She 1night have been destitute and shortly
thereafter acquired an inheritance and an ability
to care for her offspring. :Must she adopt her own
child¥ Surely, she being a suitable person, it
would have been a cruel thing for a society devoted to the welfare of children to say you can22
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not reclai1u your given word and have back your
child.
For sinrilar decision see In Re Rubin's Adoption, 60
Ohio Supp. 26 Minnesota.

In Platzer

Y.

Beardsley, 149 :Minn. 435, the court

said:
An illegitin1ate child cannot be adopted without the consent of the mother. Her consent,
though given in writing and accompanied by a
transfer of the custody of the child, may be revoked at any time before the child is legally
adopted.
For another case holding that consent may be revoked, see In Re Anderson, 189 Minn. 85; 240 N.W. 657,
where the court said :
Such a consent, once given, may be withdrawn at any time before adoption.
:Mississippi
In Wright v. Fitzgibbons, reported in 21 So. (2nd)
709 (April 1945) the facts showed that the mother of an
infant child gave her consent to its adoption and petitioner, Mrs. Fitzgibbons, filed her petition to adopt the
child based on said consent of the mother. ·The mother
then appeared, objected and withdrew her consent before
a decree was entered. The court, in aUowing a withdrawal said :
This appellant having appeared and objected
to the adoption of her child; her consent thereto
theretofore given for its adoption, becan1e ineffectual.
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The court found that the mother had abandoned the
child and the proceedings for decree of adoption were
filed in 1945 after a consent had been given in 1938 and
the 1nother evidenced little or no interest in the child
during the seven years.
Pennsylvania
Piper v. Edbert, 28A (2) 460.
January 16, 1941 a 1nother in a hospital signed a
contract to give custody of her baby to Edbergs for one
year and that they may adopt child any time within that
period. In December 1941, nwther asked for her baby
and this was refused. Adoption petition was filed by the
Edbergs and December 26th mother 'vas granted writ of
Habeas Corpus.
In ordering the child be retained to the mother the
court said:
It is a serious matter, and often times unfortunate to deprive a natural mother of her child.
It is against puhlic policy to destroy or limit the
relation of parent and child.
Louisiana
Green v. Paul, 31 So. (2) 212 La. 337.
In March 1945, the Green petitioner for the adoption of Patricia Paul, alledging that they have had custody for 14 n1onths and that the father, Charles Paul,
gave his written consent. After a report of the vVelfare
Department, the court entered an interlocutory decree of
adoption on :May 28, 1945, and awarded custody of child
24
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to the petitioners. On February 28, 1946, the father
moved for revocation of the Decree.
The Court held that the 1notion of the father constituted a withdrawal of the consent, says:
In Yiew of the fact that the Inotion filed by
Paul operates as a withdrawal of hjs consent to
the adoption of his child, we n1ust initiaHy decide
if his opposition does not effectively destroy the
adoption proceedings as a Inatter of law, even
though it be assmned that the withdrawal is
founded on whiin or caprice. 1. (The court continues to quote with approYal1 CJS P. 21, P. 306).
Consent Inay be withdrawn at any time before
adoption, even though given in writing and acconlpanied by the transfer of the custody of the
child ... The application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel in an adoption proceeding does not
appeal to us ... Adoption is a creature of the law
. . . Consequently, disallowance of the right to
"ithdraw consent on the basis of estoppel would
be tantanwunt to an approval of the adoption
where the consent is actually lacking ... a result
contrary to the intention of the law.
California
Re l\fcDonnell's Adoption, 176 P. (2) 778.
The Court stated the California rules as follows: (P.
782)
'Ve think it Inust be concluded from the adoption statutes of this state that the natural parents
have the right to withdraw a consent to adoption
at any time before the rendition of the decree of
adoption.

25
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It is apparent that the court erred in finding that.
the Consent of Adoption was irrevocable as such finding
is contrary to the law as stated by our own Supreme
Court and by the courts throughout the United States.

In the case of Harrison vs. Iiarker, 44 Utah 541, 142
Pac. 716, the court held that the best welfare and interest
of the child was the primary consideration of the court.
In that case an illegitimate child was given to the defendants by the mother and she informed them that
she was surrendering the child to them for adoption.
Several months later the mother of the child intermarried with the plaintiff who was the father of said child.
Several months later he commenced an action to regain
the custody of the child and the court held that it was
the best welfare and interest of the child that should
be considered in determining the custody under these
circumstances; that the presumption was that the best
welfare and interest of the child is with the natural parents.
3. In the case of Hardcastle vs. Hardcastle, 221
Pac. (2d) 887, our own Utah Supreme Court, the court
restated the law as laid down by Harrison vs. Harker.
In the case of Hardcastle vs. Hardcastle the mother of a
15 year old girl left her child with the grandmother.
Evidence showed that on two occasions she attempted
to take the child from the custody of the grandmother
but was prevented from doing so. The mother then
went to Portland where she worked and had an income
of approximately $80 per week as well as an allotment

26
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frmn her husband in the sun1 of $80 per n1onth. During
that time and for the next seven years she sent no monev
whatsoever for the support of the child and only visited
the child once. In 1944 she ca1ne to Salt Lake to obtain
a divorce front her husband but did nothing to regain
the custody of the child, and the court in awarding the
divorce decree awarded the custody of the child to the
grandlnother. The plaintiff then remarried and 23
months after the decree of divorce was granted she
returned and asked for the custody of the child. The
court in deciding this case held it was the best welfare
and interest of the child that should guide the court in
awarding her custody and that this presumption was
so strong that the neglect of seven years was not strong
enough to overcome.
In the case of Baldwin vs. Nielson, 170 Pac. 179, a
child was born to the plaintiff and his "rife. The plaintiff
was then in the military service. He returned home and
upon returning home lived at the home of the defendant
and while there he indulged rather heavily in the use
of intoxicating liquors. The plaintiff and his wife then
went to California and while in California the plaintiff
drank heavily and was intoxicated continually. The wife
obtained a divorce and the custody of the child was
awarded to her. The child from its birth resided with
the grandnwther and with the defendant and maternal
uncle. Approximately 2 years after the divorce the
mother of the child died and the plaintiff requested that
the custody of the child be awarded to him. Evidence
27
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showed that since his discharge frmn the Army he had
not worked; that he had married within a month after
the divorce was granted and that at the time of the hearing in the above entitled action he did not at that time
have employment but merely had the promise of employment. The court held in this case that there was a presumption that the best welfare and interest of the child
was with the natural parent and the neglect by the
father was not sufficient to overcome this presumption.
During this time also the father had contributed nothing
whatever toward the support of the child.
The petition for adoption in the case now before
the court is based entirely upon the Consent of Adoption
signed by the defendant and her husband. There were
no allegations in the petition that the plaintiff had
deserted and abandoned her children nor was there a
request in the prayer that the children be found by the
court to be deserted and abandoned children. Regardless of this fact the court n1ade a finding in the adoption
proceedings that the children had been deserted and
abandoned by the plaintiff but since they had not been
abandoned by the plaintiff they were eligible for adoption by the defendants.
This finding see1ns very unique, particularly because
the court granted the petition in part and denied it in
part. If the plaintiff had abandoned Linda Kay, Sheryl
Rae and Karen, then certainly she had abandoned Howard Wayne also, as the facts concerning all of the children were identical. Since there were no allegations in
28
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the petition for adoption that the child had been abandoned, the court would be restricted in its findings to
the allegations of that petition. The petition could have
been modified upon proper nwtion but no motion was
ever n1ade asking that the petition be modified. No
objection was raised to the introduction of testimony
because the testin1ony was being introduced in support
of the defendant's answer to the 'Vrit of Habeas Corpus,
and even though the court was justified in finding that
the children had been abandoned by the mother the court
was n1aking such findings contrary to the law as set
forth by our own Suprmne Court.
In the case of Jensen vs. Earley, 228 Pac. 217, an
illegitimate child was placed with the defendant with
the understanding that they were to be permitted to
adopt said child. The mother filed a Writ of Habeas
Corpus to regain the custody of the child and the defendant pleaded that the mother had abandoned said
child. The court in that case made the following statement:
"Abandonment in such cases ordinarily means
that the parent has placed the child on some doorstep or left it in some convenient place in the
hope that someone will find it and take charge
of it, or has abandoned it entirely to fate or
change. To make arrangetnents beforehand with
some proper and competent person to have the
care and custody of the child is not abandonment
of it, as that term is ordinarily understood."
In the case at bar, the children were placed with
the defendants who, according to their own statements,
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are competent and proper persons. Throughout the time
the children were with the adopting parents the plaintiff
visited the children and took thmn presents and also
contacted the d_efendants by mail. Certainly these children are not abandoned to fate or change nor were they
left on a door-step or anywhere else with the hope that
someone would find them and care for them.
In the case of Lucas et al. vs. Strausser,

VTF

Pac.

In the case of Lucas and others vs. Strausser, 196
Pac. (2nd) 862, the father had placed his motherless
children with his mother in January of 1944. In October
1944 the father visited the children who were then with
the plaintiff and stated he had come to make some arrangement to care for the children and that he was then
going to Alaska. The father went to Alaska where he
earned from $110 to $135 per week. From October 1944
until April 1947 he paid nothing whatever for the support of the children; he made no effort to contact the
children or his mother; in 1946 he returned to Butte,
Montana, but did not contact the children, who were in
Wyoming, until April 1947. He found that the children
were adopted and that the court had held that the children had been abandoned by him. The Wyoming court
held in that case in order to show an abandonment the
evidence must be clear that the parent did not reserve
the right to re-claim the chiidren and there must be
conduct on the part of the parents which evinces a
settled purpose to forego all parental duty and relinquish all parental clai1ns to the children. The court then
30
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eited lr innans 't:s. Luppie, 47 N.J. and Equity, 302-20A969. In the case at bar there was no evidence whatever
to show that the nwther relinquished all claims to the
children as there was an understanding between the
plaintiff a.nd defendant in the case now before the court
prior to the signing of the purported Consent of Adoption that if the plaintiff in this case ever regained her
health the children would be returned to her.
The mother visited the children and at all tin1es
manifested an interest in the1n, and nine months from
fhe date they were placed with the petitioners she asked
for their return. This was almost immediately after the
operation which had corrected the condition of her ill
health and which 'vas the cause of these children being
placed in the home of the defendants. When the children
were placed with the defendants plaintiff had been suffering very ill health for a number of years and had been
endeavoring to obtain n1edical care needed to restore
her health, and had been endeavoring for ten years to
get her husband to assume his responsibility toward
the children, but had failed in both. She informed the
defendants that because of her health and because of
her husband's conduct she was being forced to give her
children up. The court in Jensen vs. Earley, supra,
stated "That in addition to all that has been said, a gift
or an abandonment may not be lightly inferred from
either acts or language induced by grief, discouragernent
or 1nental distress." Certainly the facts in the case at bar
shows that these children were given as a result of both
discouragmnent and mental distress.
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4. That the court erred in making any finding that
it was for the best welfare and interest of said children
that they be with the defendants. That the defendant
George Q. Waddoups is of the age of 54 years. (Transcript of Testimony, Page 117, Lines 5 and 6). While
the defendant Marie W addoups is of the age of 37 years
(Trans. of Testimony, Page 149, Lines 20 and 21). While
the natural mother is of the age of 30 years and her
present husband is of the age of 41 years, and has a
weekly income of $80 per week (Trans. of Testimony,
Page 85, Lines 13 and 14; Page 131, Lines 20 to 21;
Page 84, Lines 2 to 9; Page 84, Lines 10 to 30; Page 17,
Lines 21 and 22).
That the plaintiff's husband has good habits and
appears to be a reliable person (Trans. of Testimony,
Page 17, Lines 5 and 20). That the home of the defendants is but four rooms and the children are three girls
and are forced to occupy the same bedroom as the defendants, while the home of the plaintiff has three bedroorns and the girls would have a bedro01n separate and
apart from the parents. Besides these physical facts
there is the fact that the plaintiff is the natural mother
of the children and the law is weH settled in this jurisdiction that there is a presun1ption that the childrens'
best interests are with the natural mother unless she
is 1norally unfit to have the children. This point was
discussed in the case of State vs. Sorensen, a Utah case,
and in the case of Hummel vs. Parish, a Utah case, 134
Pac. 898. In that case, however, the child was awarded
to the foster parents but the child had been away from
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the natural 1nother fr01u 1904 to 1911, during which
time the nwther 1nanifested no interest whatsoever in
the child and on one occasion in the testin1ony made a
statement that she wished the girl for selfish purposes.
However, the facts of this case are vastly different than
the one at bar. These chitdren have only been away from
the natural n1other for the period of nine n1onths when
she again asked that they be returned to her. They were
also taken with the understanding that the children
would be returned to her if her health improved. This
point was also discussed in the case of Jones vs. Moore,
a Utah case, 213 Pac. 191. There the contest was between
the father and the 1naternal grandparents. The court
made the state1nent. as follows:
"Without now pausing to go into the question
of what may be involved within the term best
interest and welfare of the child, it must suffice
to say that that tenn, as it is understood, applied
in cases like the one at bar, has reference more
particularly to the moral welfare than to mere
comfort or advantage that wea!lth can give; if
such were not the case poor parents could not
sustain their rights to the custody of children
where a rich man has taken a special interest and
where between hilnself and the children there
exists a strong liking or affection. Unless a parent
by his acts has forfeited the rights to the custody
of his minor children the presumption his rights
to have the custody are all in favor of the parent."
In this case evidence shows that the mother surrendered the children due to discouragement and despair
brought on by ill health and by an irresponsible and
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a neer-do-well husband. This point was also discussed
in the case of Hardcastle vs. Hardcastle, 221 Pac. (2d)
887. There a parent, a mother, left her children with
the grandmother for a period of seven years, during
which time she showed little interest in the child and
gave but $20 for her support. In that case the court
held that the best interests of the child is with the Inother,
and there is a presumption that the best interest is with
the natural parents; and' further stated that his presumption was so strong that the neglect of seven years
would not overcome. In the case of Baldwin vs. Neilson,
a Utah case, 170 Pac. ( 2d) 179, this doctrine was again
invoked and the child was given to the natural father
in preference to the maternal uncle. The evidence showed
that the child had been with the maternal unde from its
birth, which was a period of four years. There is nothing
in the evidence in this case which shows that the mother
is morally unfit to have the custody of the child; that
all of the testimony shows that from the time of her
marriage her primary concern has been to provide her
children with the best care possible, and it was from
worry caused by an unsettled marital life that caused
her to surrender these children with the thought that
they would receive the care and attention necessary to
afford then1 the opportunities in life to make good men
and women of them.
5. That the court erred in entering its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment as they
were contrary to and not supported by the evidence.
That in the Findings of Fact the court found that the
34
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Juvenile Court preferred a charge against plaintiff and
her husband for neglecting their children. The court
was in error in this, as there was no evidence before it
to 1nake such a finding. The only evidence given in the
testimony is on Page 3:2, Lines 18 to 22 ; Page 33, Lines
16 to 20; Page 3-!, Lines 1 to 3, and Page 70, Lines 1 to 4,
and this testi1nony was not sufficient to justify a finding
as that n1ade by the court.
(a) In paragraph 3 the court found that the plaintiff requested the defendants to take her children for
adoption, while, in fact, the testimony shows that she
infonned the plaintiffs that due to her health she was
being forced to place the children for adoption.
(b) In paragraph 5 the court 1nade a finding that
during the su1nmer of 1950 the plaintiff confirmed her
consent of adoption on several occasions and instead
the only thing stated was that she expressed satisfaction, stating she had done what was best for the children.
(c) That the court erred in finding that the plaintiff on the 9th day of ~larch 1950 was in good health
and able to care for said children and that she surrendered the children to avoid caring for them, as is shown
by the evidence in the Transcript of Testimony, as fol~
lows:
Lines 6 to 22
Page 41
8 to 12
43
25
5
2; 4 and 7 ; 2 to 4; 29
7
14 to 16; 8 to 30
8
24
10
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12
13

26 to 30
16 to 18
4 to 5 ; 10 to 13; 20 and
21; 22 to 30

15
16
34

1 to8
5 to 13
1,19,23
2 to4
27 to 30
10 to 13 ; 22 and 23
19 to 24
12 to 16
6 to 17
2 to 7
1 to 14; 19 and 21
1 to 7
21 and 23

35
9
44
59

47
48

51
52
77
78
79

(d) That the court further erred in finding that the
plaintiff had lived separate and apart from her children
except for short intervals in the past five years, and
that she had lived very little, if any, with said children,
as shown by the Transcript of Testimony:
Page

21
22
27

Lines

28
140

~3

to 24
1 to 9
19 to 24
29 and 30
22 and 27

(e) That the court further erred in finding that the
plaintiff could have made a home for the children but
that she preferred to live separate and apart from them
to satisfy her own selfish interests, and that she had
shown a lack of interest in her children and that she
was restless and uninterested in said children and that
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she had abandoned said children. That this finding is
contrary to the testin1ony. The question of abandonment has heretofore been discussed in this brief. The
Transcript of Testin1ony touching on the other matters
herein are as follows :
Page 12-!
125
141
142
53
54
63

64
67
12
13
15

16
24
12
28
31
41

46
48
50
51
52

69
71
72

74
75

76
77
80

Lines 23 to 30
20 to 30
14 and 15; 19 and 20
6 to 20
29 and 30
1 to 7
4 to 30
1 and 2
10 to 20
6 to 30
16 and 18
23 and 27
4 and 6
8 to 10
16 to 24
10 to 14
20 and 27
10 to 22
3; 23 to 25
12 to 16
19 and 23
6 and 17
2 and 7
4, 5 and 18
26 to 30
18 to 21
24 to 30
1 to 11
5 to 11
3 to 14
25 and 26
37
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112
124
125
153
154
16
177
179
181
186

4 and 7
23 and 30
20 to 30
21 and 22
14 to 22
18 to 21
6 to 14
1 to 10
16 to 20
19 to 21
(f) That the court further erred in finding that
the defendants were in the prime of life as that is a conclusion unsupported by the evidence; and they further
erred in finding that the children had favorably reacted
to their care, as shown by the Transcript of Testimony:
Page 117

126
46
113
146
118
119
42
117
118
126

Lines 5 and 6
7 to 11
12 to 16

15
15
24 to 30
1 to4

17 and 18
18 to 30
1
1 to 6

(g) That the court further erred in finding that
the father had signed a consent and waiver on the 24th
day of May 1951, as there is no testimony whatsoever
in the Transcript of Testimony, nor does the plaintiff
have any knowledge whatsoever of such testimony.
(h) That the court further erred in finding that
it was for the best welfare and interest of the children
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that they re~uain with the defendants. The only testimony touching upon this subject is as follows in the
Transcript of Testimony:
Page 117
127
149
118
126

Lines

5 and 6 ; 18 and 30
7 to 11
20 to 21
1
1 to6

That the plaintiff is much younger than the defendants and she is but 30 years of age and the purported
marriage to Kernoff Christensen has now taken place
and was consunnna ted on the 20th of June 1951.
Transcript of Testimony:
Page

85
131
84
85
17

Lines 13 to 14
20 and 21
2 to 9; 10 to 30
1 to 6
21 and 22; 5 to 20

(i) The court further erred in finding that when
the plaintiff returned from California that she had the
intent of abandoning said children, as there is no evidence whatsoever in the Transcript of Testimony or elsewhere to substantiate such a finding.
The court further erred in finding that the
plaintiff led the defendants to believe they would be free
to adopt said children and that she would make no- claim
upon said children ·and that she had made none prior
to her filing of the contest in this action. The Transcript
of Testimony showing that this was an error is as follows:
(j)
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Page

44
60
61
78
79
109
17
18
142
143
132
133
162

Lines 20 to 23
22 to 26
1 to 11; 15
21 thr<mgh 29
6 to 11
16
23 to 30
1 to 11; 22 and 25
21 to 30
1 to23
2 to 18; 3
1 to 6
1 to 11

(k) The court further erred in finding that the
plaintiff was keeping company with one Kerno:ff Christensen prior to the divorce, as there is no evidence whatsoever on which to base such a finding. The only testiInony on this subject is as follows:
Transcript of Testimony:
Page

16
95

Lines 11 to 16
17 and 18

(I) The court further erred in finding that the
mother preferred not to have the care and custody of
sa-id children, as there is no evidence upon which to base
said finding.

(n1) That the court erred in finding that the plaintiff intended to obtain relief upon which to support said
children, as the testin1ony was that she only intended
to obtain it until the purported marriage was consummated, and that the said marriage was consummated
on the 20th day of June 1951.
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Transcript of Testimony:
Page

84
85

98

Lines 4 to 30
1 to 6
4 to 9

That the finding that it was for the best welfare
and interest of the children that they be with the defendants has already been discussed in this brief.
(n) That the court erred in finding that no effort
had been n1ade to reimburse the defendants for the care
they had given the children, as the testimony shows
otherwise:
Transcript of Testimony:
Page 82
Lines 22 to 30
83
1to6
(o) That th~ court erred in finding that the plaintiff and her intended husband could not support the
children if given to them, as such finding is contrary
to the evidence :
Transcript of Testimony:
Page

84
85

Lines

4 to 30

1 to 6; 13 and 14
7 and 8
1 and 13
5 to 9

86
87

98

(p) That the court erred in finding that it would
be wrong after per1nitting said children to be with respondents for such a long period of time to rmnove said
children fr01n the hon1e of the defendants. The children
have merely been with the defendants for nine months.
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The children are young and under the age of ten years.
The court should not only look to what temporary effect
it wil'l have upon the children at this time but the long
range effect, and it is the settled law of this state that
it is for the best welfare and interest of the children
that they be with the natural parent. ':rhis was discussed
in the case of Hardcastle vs. Hardcastle, supra, by our
own Supreme Court. Two of these children were with
the plaintiff during the 1nonth of July for the period of
two weeks and they have visited with the plaintiff
throughout their stay at the defendants' home. Transcript of Testimony:
Page 59
Page 57
58
84

205

Lines 25 and 30
1 to 6
4 to 30
9 to 17

athrough-s
Based upon the foregoing the plaintiff herein urges
that the ruling of the District Court is in error and that
the same should be reversed and the plaintiff given the
relief sought in her Writ of I-Iabeaf? Corpus and in her
Answer to the Petition for Adoption.
Respectfully submitted,
WM. G. SHELTON,
BENJA~IIN SPENCE,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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